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Abstract 
 
     We investigated, empirically, why Japanese banks held excess reserves in the late 
1990s. Specifically, we pin down two factors explaining the demand for excess 
reserves: a low short-term interest rate, or call rate, and the fragile financial health of 
banks. The virtually zero call rate increased the demand for excess reserves 
substantially, and a high bad loans ratio largely contributed to the increase in excess 
reserve holdings. We found that the holdings of excess reserves would fall by half if the 
call rate were to be raised to its level prior to the adoption of the zero-interest-rate 
policy, and the bad loans ratio were to fall by 50%.        
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1. Introduction 
     Japanese banks have chronically held excess reserves since the late ‘90s. Figure 1 
illustrates the ratio of actual reserves to required reserves for commercial banks as a 
whole. The increasing trend in the excess reserve ratio has been conspicuous since the 
summer of 2001, and this ratio reached a high of 5.88 in October 2003.1 The excess 
reserve ratio typically parallels the supply of reserves. In fact, the reserve supply began to 
increase when the Bank of Japan announced that it would provide ample funds to push 
down the uncollateralized overnight call rate, or short-term inter-bank money market rate, 
as low as possible, in February 1999. This action is known as the “zero-interest-rate 
policy.” Furthermore, the reserve supply drastically increased after the Bank of Japan 
(BOJ) switched its operating target for money market operations from the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate to the outstanding balances of the current accounts 
held at the BOJ in March 2001. The target level of outstanding balances of the BOJ’s 
current accounts was valued at around five trillion yen in March 2001, but then rose to 
between 30 and 35 trillion yen by January 2004.  
     However, it should be noted that the reserve supply does not necessarily automatically 
create a demand for reserves. The aim of this study, therefore, was to shed light on the 
demand side of reserves and to conduct an empirical investigation into why commercial 
banks hold excess reserves. In actual fact, banks have their own motives for holding 
excess reserves. We identified two factors that may have affected banks’ reserve demands 
since the late ‘90s. The first of these factors is the nearly zero level of the call rate: the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate was pushed down to its minimum level after the 
adoption of the zero-interest-rate policy. Reserves and call loans are close substitutes; as a 
result, banks have more incentive to hold reserves when the call rate is very low.  
The second relevant factor is the instability of the financial system. Ever since the 
outbreak of financial institution debacles in the late ‘90s, depositors have been very 
cautious about choosing which banks to deposit their money in. This implies that, in 
general, once the balance sheet of a bank deteriorates, depositors will switch deposits 
from one bank to another, more healthy one. Therefore, banks with fragile balance sheets 
have an incentive to hold reserves, for precautionary reasons.2 Incorporating these factors, 
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we constructed a simple theoretical model of bank reserve demand. Using a panel dataset 
for banks, we estimated these banks’ optimal demand functions for reserves, as derived 
from the theoretical model. The quantitative importance of the aforementioned two 
factors was evaluated by means of a simulation analysis, based on the parameter 
estimates in the banks’ reserve demand functions.3 
     Our main findings may be summarized as follows. Using a theoretical model, we were 
able to derive each bank’s optimal demand for reserves, which is a decreasing function of 
the short-term interest rate and an increasing function of the bank’s financial health, 
represented by either its bad loan ratio or the rate of change in its share price. It turned out 
that both factors significantly impact banks’ reserve demands, as suggested by the 
theoretical model. Quantitatively, the effect of the short-term interest rate on reserve 
demand was quite large. We found that raising the call rate to 0.05%, its level just before 
the adoption of the zero-interest-rate policy, decreased the demand for excess reserves in 
the banking sector as a whole by as much as 30-40%. The effect of a bank’s financial 
health on its excess reserve demand was also significant. Excess reserves were reduced 
by 13-29% when the bad loan ratio was halved; this constitutes the goal to be attained by 
the end of FY 2004 in the Program for Financial Revival, under the Koizumi 
Administration.     
     The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides descriptive statistics for 
the banks’ reserve holdings, which are based on the panel dataset for the Japanese 
commercial banks used in our study. Section 3 constructs a simple theoretical model of 
reserve demand and derives the optimal demand equation for reserves, which are to be 
estimated. Section 4 presents the estimation results, and Section 5 conducts a simulation 
analysis, based on the estimation results from the previous section, in order to evaluate 
quantitatively the effects of the short-term interest rate and bank financial health on 
excess reserve demand. Section 6 concludes the study.   
 
2. To What Extent Did Banks Hold Excess Reserves?    
     We first calculated the extent to which commercial banks held excess reserves using 
panel data for Japanese banks during the period FY 1991 to 2002. We compared the 
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actual reserve holdings at the end of each fiscal year with the reserves required at that 
time. The required reserves were calculated as follows. The reserve requirement ratios for 
deposits depend upon the type and amount of deposits, as is shown in Table 1. For 
example, when a bank holds three trillion yen as time deposits, the bank should hold 
18.275 billion yen (= (3000-2500)×0.012 + (2500-1200)×0.009 + (1200-500)×0.0005 + 
(500-50)×0.0005) as required reserves.              
The required reserves at the end of a fiscal year are computed for each bank in our 
panel dataset, and compared with the actual reserve balance, to gauge the extent to which 
banks hold excess reserves. Our panel data set consists of 145 banks, of which nine are 
city banks, three are long-term credit banks, seven are trusts, and 126 are regional banks. 
Merged and/or insolvent banks were excluded from the sample. Therefore, our dataset 
constitutes an unbalanced panel. The sample period covers the years from FY 1991 to FY 
2002. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the extent to which banks held excess 
reserves. The median of the ratio of actual reserves to required reserves was less than one 
until 1996, while it exceeded this value after 1997. It should be noted that the year in 
which the excess reserve ratio began to exceed one was characterized by a number of 
bankruptcies of financial institutions. It is likely that banks held excess reserves for 
precautionary purposes, to meet the demands of depositors switching from unhealthy 
banks to healthy ones.  
In 2001, the excess reserve ratio again exhibited a sharp increase. The median of 
the excess reserve ratio in 2001 was about twelve times as large as that in 2000. This 
sharp increase coincided with the BOJ’s switch of monetary policy target: from the 
short-term interest rate to the outstanding balances of the current accounts at the BOJ, 
constituting the so-called “quantitative easing” of monetary policy. Under the new 
monetary policy regime, the BOJ increased the monetary base substantially.   
     The standard deviation of the excess reserve ratio also increased after the middle of the 
‘90s, suggesting that there were diverse reserve holding patterns across banks. This fact 
may also be inferred from Figure 2, which illustrates the frequency distribution of the 
excess reserve ratios in 1994, 1999 and 2001. The frequency distribution was more 
dispersed and less skewed to the right in later years.    
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3. A Model of Bank Demand for Reserves  
     Consider a bank i, which allocates a given amount of deposits ( )iD  to an 
interest-bearing asset, and with reserves at a central bank bearing no interest, under the 
stochastic withdrawal of deposits.4 By allocating all of its deposits to the interest-bearing 
asset, and keeping its reserves to the minimum required level, the bank can maximize its 
income from interest but runs the risk of being unable to meet large, unanticipated 
withdrawals of deposits. Such a situation may be costly for the bank, as it gives rise to 
apprehension among depositors regarding the fragility of the bank’s balance sheet, and 
depositors may thus be prompted to further withdraw their deposits. Therefore, the bank 
optimally allocates its resources between the interest-bearing asset and reserves, to 
maximize its expected interest income, while simultaneously taking into account the cost 
incurred in the case of reserve shortages.  
     Formally, the objective function of the bank is stated as follows: 
 
             ( ) ( )[ ]iiipiiL RXMaxErRDr −−− ~,0,               (1) 
 
                 where Lr : interest rate on interest-bearing asset          
      iPr , : penalty rate for the i-th bank in case of reserve shortage ( Lip rr >, ) 
                iR : reserve balance of the i-th bank 
                          iX
~ :  stochastic deposit withdrawal at the end of the period   
 
The bank maximizes eq.(1) with respect to iR subject to the following required reserve 
constraint:   
 
                               iii DR δ≥  
              where iδ :required reserve ratio for the i-th bank  
 
The first-order condition is given by  5 
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                [ ] λ−=≥ Liiip rRXr ~Pr,         (2) 
 
                 where [ ]Pr  indicates probability 
                            λ : non-negative Lagrangean multiplier associated with the required 
reserve constraint 
 
The LHS of eq.(2) represents the decrease in the liquidity shortage cost brought about by 
increasing reserves, or the marginal benefit of increasing reserves, while the RHS 
provides the marginal cost of increasing reserves. When 0>λ , the bank holds no more 
than the required amount of reserves. On the other hand, when the optimal reserve 
holdings ( )*iR  exceed the required level, then 0=λ . Figure 3 illustrates the way in which 
the optimal level of excess reserves is determined. When 0=λ , it is easy to see from the 
figure that the demand for reserves depends upon the interest rate ( Lr ) and the penalty 
rate ( iPr , ). The demand for reserves increases as the interest rate falls and the penalty rate 
rises. This model, while simple, can explain the surge in excess reserve holdings by 
Japanese banks that took place in the late ‘90s. The call rate was virtually zero under the 
zero-interest-rate policy, and the BOJ maintained the call rate to a level as low as possible 
under the new monetary policy regime. In the late 90s, banks with massive amounts of 
bad loans became insolvent, which may have led to a rise in the penalty rate. For this 
reason, depositors became very cautious about the balance sheet conditions of banks in an 
unstable financial system. If a bank’s reserves fell short of depositors’ withdrawals, then 
depositors may have perceived the balance sheet of the bank to be deteriorating. This 
perception would have accelerated the withdrawal of deposits, as well as the potential 
bankruptcy of the bank. To avoid such a disaster, banks would have set the penalty rate 
quite high and increased their demand for excess reserves.  
 
4. Estimation of Bank Demand Equations for Reserves 
Derivation of Bank Demand Equations for Reserves 
     To derive a bank’s optimal demand equation for reserves, we must specify the way in 
which banks anticipate deposit withdrawals. We assume that the random variable iX
~  has 
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a Pareto distribution. Specifically, the density function of iX
~  is written as 
              ( ) 1,0~~ += θθθ
i
i
i X
X
Xf      ∞<< ii XX ~,0          (3)  
                 where iX ,0,θ : parameters of the distribution  
                      0,0 ,0 >> iXθ  
 
By specifying the density function of deposit withdrawals, we may calculate the 
probability that deposit withdrawals exceed reserves, as follows: 
 
               [ ] θ−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=≥
i
i
ii X
RRX
,0
~Pr                (4) 
 
The substitution of eq.(4) into eq.(2) and the rearrangement of terms yields the following 
reserve equation: 
 
             ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−=
ip
L
ii r
rXR
,
,0 log
1loglog λθ            (5) 
 
It is quite likely that the bank’s subjective distribution of iX
~  depends on the bank’s 
attributes. When the balance sheet of a bank deteriorates, the bank may anticipate a large 
amount of deposit withdrawals. In other words, the condition of a bank’s balance sheet 
affects the distribution of its deposit withdrawals. We specify a bank’s balance sheet 
condition using the bad loans ratio ( BADLOAN ). That is, we express iX ,0  as a function 
of deposits and the bad loans ratio.  
 
           εηα iIi BADLOANDX =,0                 (6) 
                    where 0,0,0 >>> εηα  
 
Deposits are included in eq.(6) as a scale factor. Substituting eq.(6) into eq.(5) and 
arranging terms, we obtain the following optimal demand equation for reserves:  
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⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−++=
ip
L
iii r
rBADLOANDR
,
log1)log(logloglog λθεηα      (7)  
 
For estimation purposes, we transform the demand equation for reserves into the 
deviation from required reserves. First, when 0>λ , banks do not hold any excess 
reserves, so the deviation of optimal reserves from the required level is zero. In other 
words, the following equation is specified in logarithmic form:    
 
              0loglog =− iii DR δ                        (8) 
 
Second, when the optimal demand for reserves exceeds the required level, the demand for 
excess reserves is expressed as  
 
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−+−+−=−
ip
L
iiiiii r
rBADLOANDDR
,
log1)log(log1loglogloglog θεηδαδ    (9) 
 
Since we can identify from the data which banks held excess reserves, we may estimate 
the system of reserve demand equations, (8) and (9), using a Tobit.  
 
Description of the Data 
      We briefly explain the variables used in estimation. The variable ( iR ) represents the 
reserve balance of an individual bank at the BOJ. Deposits ( iD ) consist of all types of 
deposits, including certificates of deposit and debentures outstanding. The amount of 
required reserves is calculated based on the deposit balances and the requirement ratios 
provided in Table 1, as was discussed in Section 2. The required reserve ratio ( iδ ) is 
obtained by dividing the required reserves by deposits.  
     The bad loans ratio is calculated in two different ways: (1) the ratio of risk 
management loans to total loans ( iBADLOAN1 )
6and (2) the ratio of non-performing 
loans (NPL) under the Financial Reconstruction Law ( iBADLOAN 2 ).
7 The variable 
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iBADLOAN1  is available for the period including and following 1997, while the variable 
iBADLOAN 2  is available for the period including and following 1998. Accordingly, the 
estimation period in each case begins with the year in which the bad loans ratio first 
becomes available. We also use the rate of change in the share price ( iSHARE ) as a proxy 
for the market’s perception of the banks’ financial health. 8   Table 3 presents the 
descriptive statistics for the bad loans ratio. The variable iBADLOAN1  exhibited an 
increasing trend until 2001, in terms of both the mean and the median, while the same 
trend was observed for iBADLOAN 2 in terms of the median. Figure 4 presents the 
frequency distribution for bad loans ratios in 1998 and 2002, both of which are calculated 
from the risk management loans. There are considerable differences between the shapes 
of the frequency distributions in both years. In 2002, the peak of the frequency 
distribution rose, and the distribution was more skewed to the left. The correlation 
coefficient for these two measures is quite high (0.8982). However, the market’s 
perception of banks’ financial health does not necessarily closely reflect the bad loans 
ratio. In fact, the correlation coefficient between iBADLOAN1  and iSHARE  is -0.1719, 
and that between iBADLOAN 2  and iSHARE  is -0.1803.                  
     The penalty rate is likewise treated in two different ways. First, the penalty rate is 
treated as constant across banks and years. In this case, the penalty rate is subsumed into 
the constant term. Second, the ratio of operating profits to total equity is employed. The 
idea behind this is that the banks, the reserves of which are short of deposit withdrawals, 
will eventually go insolvent and lose their entire operating profits. The interest rate is the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate.  
 
Econometric Issues 
     We estimated eqs.(8) and (9) by pooled Tobit. The following procedure was used to 
classify banks, according to whether they have excess reserves. When a bank’s actual 
reserves exceed the required reserves by at least 10%, then it is identified as holding 
excess reserves. This conservative classification with respect to banks holding excess 
reserves reflects the unavailability of the daily deposit data upon which the reserve 
requirement should be based.9  During estimation, we added dummy variables to account 
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for the different types of banks, i.e., dummy variables for city banks (DCITY), long-term 
credit banks (DCREDIT), and trusts (DTRUST). We also added the dummy variable 
(DPOLICY) to control for the monetary policy regime change that occurred in March 
2001. Thereafter, the monetary base increased substantially in order to satisfy the target 
set for the current accounts balance at the BOJ.    
 
Estimation Results 
     Table 4 presents the estimation results for banks’ demands for reserves. The 
estimation is conducted for six specifications, where three variables are used to represent 
the banks’ financial health, and where two account for the penalty rate. The estimation 
results are quite satisfactory, in the sense that the coefficient estimates of the three key 
variables determining the demand for reserves are statistically significant, irrespective of 
the model specification. Deposits exert a significantly positive effect on reserve holdings. 
The call rate has a negative effect on the demand for reserves, as is predicted from the 
theoretical model in Section 3.10 The two bad loans ratios also affect the demand for 
reserves positively, which implies that banks with higher bad loans ratios increased their 
reserves. Furthermore, increases in the rate of change in share prices decreased the 
demand for reserves, though this effect is insignificant.  
     Table 5 tabulates the elasticities of reserve demands with respect to deposits, the call 
rate, and the bad loans ratio, for the four types of banks holding excess reserves. These 
elasticities are calculated on the basis of the results of the estimation with iBADLOAN1  
as the bad loans ratio, and the ratio of operating profits to total equity as the penalty rate.11 
12 The deposit elasticity is generally close to one, except for city banks, in which case it is 
much less than one (0.4491). The interest-rate elasticity ranges from -0.1816 to -0.4146, 
while the elasticity with respect to the bad loans ratio ranges from 0.2149 to 0.5010. The 
magnitude of this elasticity is smaller for city banks because, of these, a lower proportion 
of banks held excess reserves.              
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5. The Effects of the Short-term Interest Rate and Bank Financial Health on the Demand 
for Excess Reserves: A Quantitative Evaluation 
     In the previous section, we found that both the short-term interest rate and banks’ 
financial health are significant explanatory variables of the demand for reserves. Based 
on the parameter estimates of the demand equation for reserves, and using simulation 
analysis, we evaluated quantitatively the extent to which changes in the short-term 
interest rate and/or banks’ bad loans ratios affected the demand for excess reserves.  
     Specifically, we took the following steps. First, we calculated the theoretical values of 
excess reserves by substituting the actual exogenous variables for 2002 into the estimated 
demand equation for reserves, or eq.(9), and subtracted the required reserves. Next, we 
calculated the predicted value of excess reserves under different scenarios of the call rate 
and the bad loans ratio. We assumed that the call rate was raised to its level prior to the 
adoption of the zero-interest-rate policy. In other words, the call rate was set to its level in 
March 1998, or to 0.05%.13 With regard to the banks’ financial health, we considered a 
case in which the bad loans ratio was halved. This scenario is consistent with the Koizumi 
Structural Reform Plan, introduced in October 2002, which specified that 
non-performing loans should be reduced by 50% within one year.            
     The predicted excess reserves thus calculated were summed up across banks, and the 
aggregated excess reserves were compared with their baseline value. Table 6 indicates the 
extent to which banks’ excess reserves are reduced under the different scenarios for the 
call rate and the bad loans ratio, and under four different specifications of the reserve 
demand equation. When the call rate is raised, excess reserves are reduced by as much as 
40% in the constant penalty case, and by about 30% in the variable penalty case. 
Although the magnitude of the reduction in excess reserves is slightly less for the case in 
which the banks’ financial health is improved, it is not negligible in this case. Excess 
reserves are reduced by 13% to 29%. When increases in both the call rate and banks’ 
financial health are implemented simultaneously, the holdings of excess reserves are 
reduced almost by half.            
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6. Concluding Remarks 
     We empirically investigated why Japanese banks held excess reserves in the late ‘90s. 
We were able to pin down two factors that explain the demand for excess reserves: a low 
short-term interest rate, or call rate, and banks’ fragile financial health. The nearly zero 
call rate substantially increased the demand for reserves, and the high bad loans ratio also 
contributed to the observed increase in reserve holdings. A quantitative evaluation of 
these factors was also conducted. It was found that excess reserve holdings may be halved 
by raising the call rate to its level prior to the zero-interest-rate policy, and by decreasing 
the bad loans ratio by 50%. The Japanese financial system is gaining stability as banks 
rapidly eliminate bad loans, and this elimination should lead to a reduction in excess 
reserve holdings.    
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Footnotes 
 
1 There are two spikes in the figures, each of which corresponds to Year 2000 and Fiscal 
Year 2002 problems. On those occasions, the policy authority provided ample liquidity to 
meet a surge in demand and secure stability in the financial markets.   
2 See Shirakawa (2002) for a detailed discussion of the factors that have contributed to an 
increase in banks’ reserve demands since the late ‘90s.  
3 Hosono et al. (2001), Hayashi (2001), and Uesugi (2002) investigated the liquidity 
effect using daily reserve data. The relationship between the equilibrium short-term 
interest rate and the reserve supply may be obtained by aggregating banks’ reserve 
demands. Our focus in this study was to examine what motivates individual banks to hold 
excess reserves. 
4 The following model of reserve demands comes from Chapter 8 in Freixas and Rochet 
(1997).   
5 It can be shown that the objective function of the bank is a concave function of reserves, 
so the solution to the first-order condition is guaranteed to be a maximum of the objective 
function.    
6 Risk management loans include loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy, past-due loans 
in arrears by six months or more, loans in arrears by three months or more but less than 
six months, and restructured loans.    
7 The NPLs under the Financial Reconstruction Law are defined as the sum of the assets 
classified as “bankrupt/de facto bankrupt,” “doubtful,” and “special attention.”   
8 Some banks are not listed on the stock exchange, so these are excluded from the sample 
in the estimation of the demand equation for reserves incorporating the share price. 
9 To check for robustness, we also used a more conservative definition of excess reserves. 
In this case, banks with actual reserves exceeding the required reserve by 50% were 
identified as banks holding excess reserves. Under this definition, the estimation results 
remained qualitatively unchanged.    
10 Loan and Wood (2002) also reported that the interest rate has a significantly negative 
effect on the reserve demands of commercial banks in the U.S.A.  
11 The elasticities are calculated by multiplying the adjustment factor by the original 
parameter estimates. See Chapter 16 of Wooldridge (2002) for a discussion of adjustment 
factors. 
12 The elasticities based on the other specifications are calculated in a similar way. They 
are not reported here, since they follow the same pattern as that reported in the text. These 
elasticity estimates are available upon request from the author.     
13 It is assumed that the penalty rate does not change. 
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The Excess reserve ratio is defined as the ratio of actual reserve to required reserve.
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Figure 2 Frequency Distribution of Excess Reserve Ratio in 1999
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Figure 2 Frequency Distribution of Excess Reserve Ratio in 2001
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Figure 4
Frequency Distribution of Bad Loans Ratio in 1998
Based upon Risk Management Loans
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Figure 4
Frequency Distribution of Bad Loans Ratio in 2002
Based upon Risk Management Loans
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Table 1 
Reserve Requirement Ratios 
 
(1) Reserve Ratios on Deposits 
                                                              
Type of deposits Amount of deposits  Reserve ratio (%) 
2.5 trillion yen - 1.2 
1.2 - 2.5  
trillion yen 
0.9 
 
500 billion  
- 1.2 trillion yen  
0.05 
 
Time Deposits  
including Certificates  
of Deposit 
50 - 500 billion yen 0.05 
2.5 trillion yen – 
 
1.3 
1.2 - 2.5  
trillion yen 
1.3 
500 billion  
- 1.2 trillion yen 
0.8 
Other deposits 
50 - 500 billion yen 
 
0.1 
 
 
(2) Reserve Ratios on Debentures Outstanding 
 
Type of banks Reserve ratio (%) 
Banks, 
long-term credit banks 
and foreign exchange bank
          
0.1 
 
 
Notes: The reserve ratios in the table are effective on October 16, 1991.  
Data Source: The Bank of Japan Homepage 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Banks’ Excess Reserve 
 
Fiscal year  Ratio of actual reserve to required reserve  
         Median         Standard deviation  
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
          0.9564              2.82  
          0.9730              2.79  
          0.9337              2.76  
          0.9085              1.56  
          0.9828              5.36  
          0.9960              7.23  
          1.0191              8.65  
          1.1884             25.78  
          3.9963             39.38  
          1.1936             24.59  
         15.1764             39.25  
         12.6861             52.65  
Data Source: Nikkei Financial Data  
        
 
Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics of Bad Loans Ratio  
   
                                                               (%) 
Fiscal 
year 
 ratio of risk management     ratio of non-performing loans 
loans to total loans        under Financial Reconstruction 
( iBADLOAN1 )               Law to total loans 
    ( iBADLOAN2 ) 
Mean    Median         Mean    Median 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
    6.1        4.5              7.5        5.6 
7.7        6.0             10.0        6.6 
    8.1        6.9              9.4        7.6 
    8.7        8.1             10.0        9.0  
    8.2        8.1              9.0        8.8  
     Notes: Risk management loans include loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy,  
past due loans in arrears by 6 months or more, loans in arrears by 3 months or more 
and less than 6 months, and restructured loans.  
The non-performing loans under the Financial Reconstruction Law are defined as 
the sum of the assets classified as “bankrupt/de facto bankrupt”, “doubtful”, and 
“special attention.” 
     Data Source: Nikkei Financial Data  
 
Table 4  Estimation Results of Optimal Demand Equation for Reserve 
 
Choice of banks’  
balance sheet variable  
and penalty rate  
Constant    Deposit   Call rate    Bad loans ratio                    Dummy variables                           
                    or share price     City banks    Long-term     Trust      Monetary    σ      NOBS 
              change                     credit banks     banks     policy change         LOGL 
BADLOAN1 
Case 1 
Constant penalty rate 
 
Case 2 
Variable penalty rate 
 
BADLOAN2 
Case 3 
Constant penalty rate 
 
Case 4 
Variable penalty rate 
 
Share price change
Case 5 
Constant penalty rate 
 
Case 6 
Variable penalty rate 
 
 
   
-19.3073***  1.5453***  -0.9554***   0.5771***        -0.9914**     -0.6204      0.5564      0.5931***    1.6518***   618 
 (-14.32)    (19.09)      (-10.24)     (3.89)            (-2.07)        (-0.93)      (1.44)       (3.89)        (28.38)    -1009.00 
 
-15.0960***  1.5531***  -0.6279***   0.7588***        -1.0974**     -0.3234      0.2812      0.7259***    1.6708***   597 
 (-11.67)    (18.61)      (-8.28)      (4.58)            (-2.27)        (-0.44)      (0.70)       (4.65)        (27.90)    -980.38 
      
            
-18.1284***  1.4303***  -0.9426***   0.3014**         -0.8260*      -0.3444      0.6311*     0.4194***    1.6133***   548 
 (-13.49)    (16.92)      (-10.34)     (2.09)            (-1.75)        (-0.53)      (1.66)       (2.66)        (27.24)    -903.41 
 
-14.0622***  1.4422***  -0.6290***   0.4938***        -0.9334*      -0.0391      0.3507      0.5341***    1.6416***   530 
 (-10.90)    (16.47)      (-8.28)      (3.04)            (-1.95)        (-0.05)      (0.88)       (3.30)        (26.80)    -882.02 
   
 
-17.5540***  1.3032***  -0.9735***  -0.6614           -0.3524                   0.9609**    0.6495***    1.5456***   476 
 (-11.01)    (13.24)      (-9.79)      (-1.54)           (-0.71)                    (2.56)       (4.16)        (24.87)    -754.08 
 
-14.7277***  1.3443***  -0.7190***  -0.5445           -0.5970                   0.7637*     0.7924***    1.5805***   465 
 (-9.43)     (13.02)      (-8.59)      (-1.21)           (-1.17)                    (1.91)       (4.99)        (24.57)    -745.34   
 
Notes:  σ : standard deviation of disturbance   LOGL: logarithm of likelihood function  NOBS: number of observations 
Values in parentheses are t-values.   *, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
 
Table 5 
Estimates of Reserve Demand Elasticity   
 
Types of banks 
 
  Deposit       Call         Bad loan 
               rate          ratio  
City banks 
 
Long-term credit 
Banks 
 
Trust banks 
 
Regional banks 
 
   0.4491      -0.1816        0.2194 
 
   1.0255      -0.4146        0.5010 
 
 
   0.8902      -0.3599        0.4349 
 
   0.9462      -0.3825        0.4623  
     Notes: The elasticity is calculated for banks holding excess reserve  
on the basis of estimation results with iBADLOAN1  as  
the bad loan ratio and the ratio of operating profits to total  
equity as penalty rate. 
 
Table 6 
Effects of Call Rate Increase and Reduction of Bad Loans Ratio on Demand for Excess 
Reserve: Quantitative Evaluation by Simulation Analysis 
 
(%) 
Choice of banks’  
balance sheet variable  
and penalty rate 
            Change of excess reserve by  
increase of call rate  reduction of 
 to 0.05%         bad loans ratio       total  
                 by 50%  
BADLOAN1 
Case 1 
Constant penalty rate 
 
Case 2 
Variable penalty rate 
 
BADLOAN2 
Case 3 
Constant penalty rate 
 
Case 4 
Variable penalty rate 
 
 
 
    -40.1             -22.8           -51.7 
 
 
    -29.6             -28.8           -47.9 
 
 
 
    -39.4             -12.8           -45.9 
 
 
    -29.3             -19.9           -41.9  
 
